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ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
games has the same effect and is unjustifiable as well.
-J.M.K.
VIDEO SOFTWARE DEALERS ASS'N V. WEBSTER, 968 F.2D 684 (8TH
CIR. 1992).
A Missouri statute prohibited the rental or sale to minors of
videos depicting violence and required dealers to display or main-
tain such videos in separate areas of their stores. Three groups,
associations whose members rent or sell videos, an association of
film producers and distributors, and owners and operators of video
retail stores brought preenforcement class challenges to the consti-
tutionality of the statute.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional. The
court determined that the statute was not narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling state interest because it did not articulate the
type of violence it deemed harmful to minors. The statute did not
"refer to slasher videos or define the term 'slasher,' " therefore cov-
ering all types of violence. This was held to be too burdensome on
protected expression. The court also found the statute unconstitu-
tionally vague. Because there was no definition of "violence," peo-
ple of common intelligence would not be able to determine the
meaning of the statute. Finally, the court held that the statute un-
constitutionally imposed strict liability because it was "quasi-crim-
inal" in nature, and violated the First Amendment because video
dealers would be reluctant to rent the videos, thereby restricting
the public's access to constitutionally protected videos.
-M.D.B.
KRAFT, INC. V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 970 F.2D 311 (7TH
CIR. 1992).
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that Kraft, Inc.
had violated the Federal Trade Commission Act by misleading
consumers through deceptive advertising. The advertising cam-
paign claimed that Kraft Singles American Pasteurized Cheese
Food contained the calcium content of five ounces of milk and was
superior in this respect to imitation slices. The FTC ordered Kraft
to cease and desist from making the misrepresentations and Kraft
filed a petition for review.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the FTC's or-
der, finding that the advertisements violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act. First, the court established that the standard for
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reviewing the FTC's findings would be the highly deferential sub-
stantial evidence test because the findings required resolution of
extremely complex and technical factual issues, and the question
of whether an advertisement is deceptive was more "akin to a find-
ing of fact than a conclusion of law." Secondly, the court held that
the FTC could rely on its own analysis in determining what claims
an advertisement conveys without examining extrinsic evidence, as
long as those claims are reasonably clear from the face of the ad-
vertisement. The court reasoned that extrinsic evidence was not
necessary because "common sense and administrative experience
provide the commission with adequate tools to make its findings."
Finally, the court determined that the advertisements did violate
the Federal Trade Commission Act because it was unlikely that
the average consumer knew that 30% of the calcium was lost in the
processing of the product, and the implication that consumers will
receive five ounces of milk by consuming the product was a mate-
rial misrepresentation.
-M.D.B.
BECHTEL v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 957 F.2D 873
(D.C. CIR. 1992).
The Federal Communications Commission denied licenses to
Galaxy Communications, Inc. and Susan Bechtel for a new FM ra-
dio station and awarded the license to a competitor, Anchor. A ma-
jor factor in the FCC determination was the degree of "integra-
tion" of ownership into management. Both Galaxy and Anchor had
100% integration with the respective owners participating full-
time in the radio station operations, while Bechtel was prepared to
hire outside management. Galaxy alleged that Anchor's proposal
regarding integration was a sham, while Bechtel alleged that the
integration criterion no longer serves its stated objectives of ensur-
ing "greater sensitivity to an area's changing needs."
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
in regard to Galaxy's challenge of Anchor's proposal, substantial
deference would be accorded to the FCC's determination, espe-
cially since the Commission's findings of factual and credibility is-
sues were in accord with those of the administrative law judge. The
court then determined that the record supported Anchor's
promises pertaining to integration. Regarding Bechtel's claim, the
court ordered the FCC to respond to Bechtel's challenges and to
consider her application in light of those challenges. The FCC was
instructed to demonstrate why its focus on the integration crite-
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